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REMISSION AND TRANSMISSION IN AMERICAN
CONFLICT OF LAWS
LINDELL

T.

BATES*

Differences in the rules of private international law in the various
countries have given rise to the legal problem called in French "Renvoi", in German "Ruckverweisnng". The nearest English word is
"Remission". Simply stated, the problem is this: When the law of
the place of trial refersto a foreign law is that foreign law to be read
as exclusive or inclusive of the private international law? If the reference is merely to foreign so-called 'internal' law, the solution is
directly found; but if the reference is conceived to include the foreign
rules of private international law, or as we say, the Conflict of
Laws, and these refer the solution back to the lex fori or to still another foreign law, the solution is not directly found. Thus if the
foreign rules of Conflict of Laws were followed the lex fori might find
itself applying its own internal law or that of a foreign country different from the one originally consulted. In the language of the continental authors it may make a simple "remission" (Renvoi) back to
the law of the place of trial, or a "transmission" (Weiterverweisung) to
the law of still another country. In our Conflict of Laws nomenclature
the French word "Renvoi" is used to cover both remission and transmission.
An example of transmission is the following: An Englishman
domiciled in France dies intestate in New York leaving personal
property in the State. The Anglo American law looks to the law of
the late domicile to determine the manner of distribution. New York
Conflict of Laws would therefore refer to French law as lex domicilii,
French Conflict of Laws would refer to British law as lex tnationalis.
Should the New'York court refuse the transmission and apply the
French statute of distributions, or accept the transmission and apply
the British? A question of remission would be presented if the decedent were a national of the United States in which instance the
problem is still further complicated because, by the hypothesis taken,
he had no domicile at all on this side of the water.
In these circumstances, according to Beale:
"Three courses are open to the law of the forum: i. To refuse
the renvoi, remit the case in turn to the foreign law, and thus
engage in a perpetual deadlock; 2. To accept the renvoi and
*Member of the Bar of United States, of England and of Spain.
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decide the question in accordance with the terms of its own law,
on the ground that the attempt to settle it in accordance with
the foreign law has failed: "an expedient resorted to in order to
reach a solution." 3. To disregard the renvoi and decide the
question in accordance with the terms of the foreign law, on
the ground that the foreign substantive law [i. e., internal law]
alone concerns the question, and there is no submission to the
foreign doctrines as to the conflict of laws."'
It is surprising that so vital a question should be of relatively recent
origin abroad and almost wholly new to the United States. The
question has arisen rarely in this country because the several States
have for the most part similar rules regarding private international
law, so that Renvoi can but rarely take place. It may do so, however,
for instance in the field of the validity of contracts. Between the
states and foreign countries the problem has already been presented
and in the future on many occasions it surely will again require adjudication. Speaking of the novelty of the Renvoi question, Lorenzen
says:
"Notwithstanding its fundamental nature in the science of
Private International Law the above question was not raised by
earlier writers on the subject, though occasion was not wanting.
They appear to have assumed that in the nature of things the
rules of Private International Law were to point out the law
which should itself distribute the property, determine the
capacity, decide upon the validity of a marriage, etc., and thus
called for the application of the internal or territorial law of the
foreign State to the exclusion of its rules of Private International
Law. Even in modern times the same assumption appears to
have been made by the continental'2 jurists as well as by those
of England and the United States."
Regarding the fundamental importance of the matter, Buzatti,
an Italian authority, writes:
"The doctrine of Renvoi means nothing else than a change in
the character and function of conflict rules. Till now they have
been understood to determine the internal law directly applicable to a juristic relation. Instead of this, the Renvoi doctrine
would have them exercise the function of indicating the laws
which determine the internal law directly applicable to a juristic
relation."' 3
In favor of including in the reference the whole foreign law and
accepting a Renvoi, it is argued that the lex fori in referring to a
foreign law desires a solution such as a foreign law court would give.
hx BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1916) 76.
2Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign Law

(igIO) IO

COL. L. REv. x90, 191.
3BUZATTI, THEORIA DEL RINVIO

NEL

DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE

(1898) 77.
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Were the legal issue presented to a foreign court, i. e., in the illustration used, a French court, .the latter's own Conflict of Laws rules, if
applicable, would surely be considered. So it would be inconsistent
for the lex for to refer to the law of a foreign country and notwithstanding decide otherwise than would a court of the same foreign
sovereign in applying this law. To this, the answer is that a reference
to the whole of a foreign law cannot practically take place. If one
were to consult the whole foreign law, foreign procedure and public
policy should logically be applied, but in actual practice foreign procedure is nearly if not always excluded in a reference to foreign law
and foreign public policy is rarely taken into account. An American
court decides as an American court, not as a French one.
A further argument in support of the doctrine that the reference is
to the totality of foreign law, so that Renvoi should be accepted is
found in the so-called "d~siste rent" theory. This asserts that when
the foreign law refers the problem whether back or further afield, the
remission or transmission indicates that the foreign law first consulted
(the French in the present illustration), has itself no solution, but
desists or withdraws from the problem. In such case it is argued that
the lexfori should itself apply, to fill the vacancy, or lacuna. To this
argument the answer is that the theory of withdrawal is a fiction;
there is no real withdrawal. A solution does exists and could be found
in the foreign internal law first consulted.
To the arguments favoring the reference to the whole of the foreign
law and the consequent acceptance of the so-called Renvoi doctrine
several objections may be opposed.
Thus, a reference to the whole of the foreign law may mean the
creation of an endless circle of references. Kahn explains this complication as follows:
"The principle of Renvoi is logically unworkable. If the rule
adopted by our system is so framed that the foreign law is to be
applied in its totality, including its rules of private international
law, it must also be the import of the foreign rule that our law in
its turn is to be applied in its totality, including our own rules of
private international law. The consequence is-that in virtue of
the foreign law ours is applied in its totality and in virtue of ours,
so on and so
the foreign law is again applied in its totality and
'4
on; a logical 'cabinet of mirrors' (Spiegelkabinet).
Finally, it is argued by opponents of Renvoi that the lex fori in
referring to a foreign law, desires a solution according to the particular judicial system referred to and not a solution according to the
system of the lex fori or that of some other foreign law.
4

KAHN, 30 JHERING'S JAHRBUCHER (1897) 23.
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Concerning the merits of the controversy, a considerable majority
of the foreign jurists are opposed to obeying a Renvoi, that is, in
the illustration, to going beyond the rules for distribution of an intestate's property indicated by the French law. In x9oo the Institute
of International Law, by a vote of 17 to 7, adopted the following resolution:
"When a legislator, establishing a rule of private international
law, designates as directly applicable by his courts to a given
subject a certain foreign civil law, he ought- not to subordinate
,the application of that law to the condition that it be also prescribed by the foreign legislation to which the civil law so designated is a part."' ,
By this resolution is meant that a reference is to internal law,
merely, notwithstanding that the foreign Conflict of Laws may provide that in a like case arising in the foreign country its own internal
law would not apply.
So much for the problem and its implications. Of the Civil Law
countries, France accepts the Renvoi and Weiterverweisung doctrines
to the fullest extent; Germany and Switzerland are also usually in
favor of Renvoi. Italy is opposed. 6 The British authors and courts
are unfortunately still so far at odds on the question that no English
rule can be cited as authority to assist our American courts to reach
a decision. 7
In the United States few cases bear directly upon the Renvoi question. The courts have us~ually overlooked the problem.
Consider first the situation in New York. (i) In re Cruger'sWill.8
In this case an American testator, de facto domiciled in France but
leaving personal property in New York, made a will in France in
French form. He disregarded the legal reserve or IMgitime established by French law in favor of children, and purported to dispose of

518 ANNUAIRE

DE L'INsTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1900) 3.
6PoTu, LA QUESTION DU RENVOI EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVA (1913)

75,

1o9, 116, 120.
The situation in England has been described by Abbott (Abbott, Is Renvoi a
Part of 71he Common Law? (I9o8) 24 L. Q. REV. 133) and J. P. Bate (BATE,
NoTs ON THE DocTRINE OF RENvoi IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1904))
who are both opposed to Renvoi; also by Westlake (I8 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1900)

35) and Dicey, who favor it. The latter re-

marks; "The contention here maintained is that, in any English rule of private
international law, the term "law of a country", which is admittedly ambiguous,
means, as applied to a foreign country, e.g., Italy..., any principle of law, whether
it be the local law of Italy or not, which the Courts thereof apply to the decision
of the case to which the rule refers," DICEY, CONFLIcT OF LAws (4th ed. 1927)
811 app.
'36 Misc. 477, 73 N. Y. Supp. 812 (Surr. Ct. i9or).
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more of his property than the French statute of distributions allowed.
The Surrogate enforced the reserve, namely French internal law, apparently overlooking the fact that the material validity of a will, according to French private international laws, is governed by lex
nationalis, namely, in the case at bar, by New York law, which recognizes no such reserve.
Dupuy v. Wurtz.9 This case is as follows: A New York citizen,
(2)
who had resided abroad for some twelve years, made her will in
France in American form. It was argued by counsel for the proponent that New York domicile had in fact been retained and that
no domicile could be acquired by an American in France without a
French Presidential decree. This argument amounted to alleging a
Renvoi on domicile from French law to New York law. The court
found that in fact New York domicile had never been lost. The court,
however, stated:
"The inquiry into domicil becomes unnecessary if it turns out
that, with respect to this individual succession, the law of New
York and of France is the same, for when we speak of the law of
domicil as applied to the law of succession we mean not the
general law, but the law which the country of domicil applies
to the particular case under consideration. ' 9 (Maltass v. Maltass,

i Rob. Ecc. R.

72..

per Dr. LuSmNGTON). "

a

This would appear to be a dictum in favor of applying any Renvoi
found in the whole of foreign law.
(3) Matter of Tallmadge.10 The facts of this case are these: An
American citizen of New York domiciled de facto in France, made his
will in New York leaving a joint legacy. One of the joint legatees died
before the testator, and the issue was whether the legacy lapsed under
New York law or accrued to the survivor under French. Egerton L.
Winthrop, Jr., Referee, decided that the French law of wills should be
applied, whereby the survivor took the whole legacy. He therefore
refused to consider the French Conflict of Laws; which provided that
the effect of a will as to substance should be determined by lex nationalis. The Renvoi problem was directly raised in the case and thoroughly considered. The contestant who sought to have New York law
applied, relied principally upon the "d~sistement" theory to support
the remission, but the Referee and the Surrogate who confirmed the
report rejected this theory and condemned Renvoi. After an extensive
review of the authorities, Mr. Winthrop said:
"On account of its inconsistency with common-law theories
of the conflict of laws, its fundamental unsoundness, and the
053 N. Y. 556 (1873).

/

. 573.

1009 Misc. 696, 181 N. Y. Supp 336 (Surf. Ct. i199).
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chaos which would result from its application to the conflicts
arising between the laws of the states of this country, it is my
opinion that the "Renvoi" has no place in our jurisprudence.""
The problem of Renvoi has also been presented in other States. (a)
New Jersey. Harralv. Harral" In this case an American citizen
married a French woman in France, observing the French solemnities.
As there was no express contract of marriage, the wife at the death of
the husband claimed to have been married under the regime of community property, that is the French system. The matrimonial domicile in fact was France and the court found that both French and New
Jersey law applied the rule lex domicilii matrimonii to the property
relations of married couples. The court further found that de facto
domicile in France was sufficient matrimonial domicile in French law
and so allowed the wife's claim to a division of the estate under the
terms of French internal law. The Court looked beyond the internal
French law governing married couples' property to the law of domicile and to the French Conflict of Laws rule concerning marriage contracts, but ended by applying French internal law.
(b) Pennsylvania. Mlatter of Baird." A Pennsylvania citizen de
'facto domiciled in France, made his will in New York in New York
form. It was contested in Pennsylvania on the ground that it was not
in one of the three forms provided by internal French law. Pennsylvania law referred to French law, as lex domicilii at the date of death.
The French Conflict of Laws rule is that a will of a foreigner is valid
as to form if made in the form provided by the lex loci actus. The
will, in fact, was valid as to form underNew York law; it was accordingly sustained in Pennsylvania. This is apparently the first case in
the United States in which a court, rejecting the arguments opposed
to Renvoi, deliberately decided to accept it. The case involved not
remission but transmission. It is to be regretted that the case went
no further, being compromised before the appeal was heard. The
Pennsylvania court did not attempt to explain why it accepted Renvoi
(Weiterverweisung) and appeared not to grasp the significance of the
problem.
(c) Minnesota. Lando's Estate.4 Two American citizens married
in Hamburg without observing the requirements of internal German
law, but fulfilling the simple requirements of Minnesota law. After
the husband's death the wife sued in Minnesota for dower in her husn1 Tbid. 715, I8r N. Y. Supp. at 348.

1239 N. J. Eq. 279 (1884).
l3Orphan's Court of Philadelphia, July 18, 1916.
14J12 Minn. 257, 127 N. W.

1125

(1910).
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band's real estate. Her claim was opposed on the ground that the
marriage was illegal for failure-to comply with the German formalities.
The Darties to the suit quoted in a stipulation the German code provisions which they deemed applicable and included therein a Conflict
of Laws provision, which the Minnesota court thought adopted lex
patriaeas a test of the formal validity of marriage between foreigners.
Minnesota law referred to German law as lex loci contractionis, and
this law in turn referred back to Minnesota law as lex patriae. Minnesota law was applied and the marriage was declared valid. The
Lando case is of doubtful authority because the decision was influenced
by public policy in favor of the validity of a marriage, and the parties
in their stipulation had included the German Conflict of Laws provision.
A few other cases exist in which a Renvoi has taken place, but they
do not clearly pass upon the remission problem or decide the particular issue in a manner which assists a solution.
Turning now to the American legal writers, Lorenzen, *riting in
igio, before the Lando, Baird and Tallmadge cases were decided, said:
"The renvoi doctrine is, therefore, no part of the Conflict of
Laws of the United States. Its introduction into our law would
be most unfortunate on account of the uncertainty and confusion to which it would give rise in the administration of justice
and its demoralizing effect upon the future development of the
Conflict of Laws."'15
Of the other distinguished American authors on private international law neither Wharton,"6 nor Story,17 refers at all to the Renvoi
question. Speaking of the conflict rules governing wills, Minor makes
the obscure statement that "the strict letter of the lex domicilii of
the testator at the time of his death will control, and no foreign law
can be incorporated into it for the purpose of any particular case."' 8
An excellent article has been written by the late Ernst Otto Schreiber,
Jr.19 in Which he also comes out against Renvoi. Beale says:
"We may be the less troubled about the finer points of this
discussion because the territorial theory of the conflict of laws,
which is accepted by the American courts, has no room for any
doctrine of renvoi. If an American court, having according to
the territorial theory to apply its own law to existing rights,
finds that a right has, by its law, arisen under another law, it
15

Lorenzen, op. cit. supra note 2, at 344.
WHARTON,
'
CONFLICT OF LAws (3d ed. 89o5).
17
STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed. x883).
'SMINOR, CONFLICT OF LAW (2d. ed. 1901) 334.
19Schreiber, The Doctrine of Renvoi in Anglo-American Law (1918) 31 HARv. L.
REV. 523.
6
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has only to learn the terms of that law and the nature of the
right which it created; if, on the other hand, it is a question of a
new right, created by the law of the forum, but the latter law in
creating the right acts in accordance with the provisions of some
foreign law, as for instance the law of a foreign domicil, again it
has only to learn the terms of that particular foreign law and
apply it. In no case is the court concerned with the20views of any
foreign court on a question of the conflict of laws."
Goodrich who is the latest writer on the subject is still another
opponent of Renvoi. He says:
"While the accepting of the Renvoi theory seems to have
found some place in English decision, it seems not to have been
adopted in this country .... On common law principles of the
21
Conflict of Laws there is no occasion for using the doctrine." '
Notwithstanding the foregoing,. the American Law Institute's
Tentative Restatement No. 2, of February 27th,

1926,

on the Con-

flict of Laws, accepts Renvoi in two classes of cases. Sections 7 and 8
read as follows:
"7. Except as stated in Section'8, if a right alleged to have
been created in one state is brought in question in a court of another state, its existence will be determined by that court,
applying only such part of the law of the first state as determines
in that state the creation of similar rights involving no question
of foreign law."
"8. If a question of status or of title to land is to be determined, the court first decides in accordance with its own
Conflict of Laws, by the Law of what state the existence of the
status or of the title is to be determined and then it decides
the question as it would be decided by a court of that state."
Commenting upon these Sections the learned Coimnittee which
drafted them says:
"This is not a case of adopting the foreign law in toto to govern
its decision."
The exception was recognized under the "vested rights" theory and
in an effort to obtain uniformity in the attitude of courts toward
20

BEALE, op. cit. supra note I, at 77.
G0ODmca, HANDBOOK ON CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (1927) 23.

21

The various un-

versity law reviews contain valuable notes on the Renvoi doctrine, In particulair,
see (1919) i9COL. L.REv. 496; 69113) 11 MICH. L. REV. 236; (1926) 25 Mica. L.
REV. 174; (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 1046; and (1920) 29 YALE L. 3. 2i4. LORENZEN,
CASES ON THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS (2d ed.

1924)

834 should be mentioned as a

source of instructive comments on British and American cases. Lorenzen, The
Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws-Meaning of "The Law of a country"
(1918) 27 YALE L. J.509 likewise merits close attention.
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foreign divorce. Dean v. Dean supports the exception in relation to
status.
The present situation appears to be that the American authorswho
have investigated the subject are in majority opposed to Renvoi, but
some admit Renvoi in relation to status and land. The New York
courts are now opposed to Renvoi in testamentary matters, but the
Pennsylvania and New Jersey courts have rendered decisions which
support Renvoi in this relation. Minnesota applied Renvoi to a question of status and so did New York. Consequently the problem may
be said to be still unsolved in American law and no established rule
yet exists for the solution of this important Conflict of Laws problem.
'2I3 App.

Div. 36o, 21o N. Y. Supp. 695 (4 th Dept. 1925).

